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INTRODUCTION

As anyone who has ever been responsible for or involved in significant
decision-making knows, a failure to make a decision is, in itself, a decision. 1 And
as the late Peter F. Drucker noted decades ago when discussing effective decision-making, inaction is not a risk-free proposition: "One has to make a decision
when a condition is likely to degenerate if nothing is done. The effective decision-maker compares effort and risk of action to risk of inaction." 2 There is no
area where this basic truism has more resonance, and is potentially more consequential, than in the area of national security decision-making, where the cost of
inaction can be at a premium. Poorly informed or precipitous decisions and
actions carry their own risks and can often lead to suboptimal results. But so too
can decision delay and paralysis in the face of gathering or ongoing threats. As
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Georgetown Journal of National Security Law and Policy, and the Founder and Principal of Jus Novus
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Advocate to U.S. Cyber Command, as a Deputy Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Operational Law Branch Chief in the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army, the
Staff Judge Advocate to United States Army South, on detail as a Special Assistant United States
Attorney with the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, and on deployment to the
Republic of North Macedonia as part of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force and as the
Chief of International Law for Combined Forces Command, Afghanistan. I would like to thank Tech,
Law & Security Program Fellow Justin Sherman for his assistance in putting this essay together.

© 2021, Gary P. Corn.
1. The familiar adage is attributed to the American philosopher and psychologist William James. See
2 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 532-534 (Dover Publ'n 1950) (1890).
2. PETER F. DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT: TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIEs, PRACTICES
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the Romans learned long ago, fiddling in the face of a crisis can be both disastrous
and a dereliction.
Finding the right balance between decision-making processes that facilitate
timely, well-informed and coordinated national-security decisions and those that
Nero would have admired has never been easy, with successive administrations
and National Security Councils (NSCs) wrestling with this dilemma in different
ways. While in theory most everyone will rail against overly bureaucratic processes and eschew the proverbial "long screwdriver," in practice it often becomes
the tool of choice for managing, or better stated, avoiding risk.3 But one thing has
become very clear in the years since the tragic events of September 1 h: advances
in technology and the increasingly complex nature of the national security threats
they engender have exacerbated, not alleviated, this dilemma. Emerging technology has introduced new and complex threats that, in many instances, compress
decision space and timelines and magnify the risks of inaction.
When it comes to national security, new technologies have always been a
double-edged sword of opportunity and risk. In the past, owing to its dominance
in technology development, the United States was generally able to blunt, or at
least forestall, the risk side of the blade while reaping the benefits of new technology. This was certainly the case in the initial years after September 1 I, at least
with respect to the counterterror and insurgency operations that until recently
dominated the national security landscape.
But owing to myriad factors-not the least of which is the unprecedented shift
of research, development, and dissemination of technology to the private sector
-the United States can no longer rely on a distinct competitive edge over its
adversaries, especially in light of the reemergence of near-peer, nation-state
adversaries and the return of so-called Great Power Competition. Not only has
the lag time between the development of new technologies and their general proliferation diminished significantly, in many instances, our adversaries threaten to
beat us to market or outpace us. According to the most recent Annual Threat
Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, this trend will continue:
"Following decades of investments and efforts by multiple countries that have
increased their technological capability, US leadership in emerging technologies
is increasingly challenged, primarily by China. We anticipate that with a more
level playing field, new technological developments will increasingly emerge
from multiple countries and with less warning." 4 The rapid evolution of cyberspace, the hyper-competitive state of relative cyber capabilities and capacity, and

-

3. The "long screwdriver" is a well-known metaphorical reference to micromanagement from
Washington of national security operations, first coined by Admiral Joseph Metcalf during the Vietnam
War. See, Christopher J Lamb, The Micromanagement Myth and Mission Command: Making the Case
for Oversight of Military Operations, 33 INST. NAT'L STRAT. STUDIES STRAT. PERSPECTIVES 1, 11 n. 49
(2020)(citations omitted), tt s: erma.cc
4. OFF. DIR. NAT'L INTEL., ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

20 (2021).

2021]

DECISION-MAKING AND TECHNOLOGY

63

the prolific use of cyber operations in the strategic, quasi-conflict space of the socalled "gray zone" is a prime example.
Although the cyber threat landscape is still nascent and evolving, it is painfully
clear that as a nation we have been shooting behind the target for too long. As
recent events like the Solar Winds Breach, the Microsoft Exchange Server hack,
and the ransomware operation against Colonial Pipeline all demonstrate, we have
yet to achieve an acceptable level of national cyber security. While this overall
cyber insecurity is not the result of any single cause or failure, important lessons
have emerged about the costs of decision delay and inaction that should be
instructive for how we approach other emerging technologies. The welldocumented shift in 2018 to a more proactive cyber strategy was premised in
large measure on the recognition that the prior policy of restraint and concomitant
failure to respond to cyber threats in a timely and meaningful way had encouraged, not deterred, our adversaries.' Implementation of this new strategy therefore required the adoption of a more responsive decision-making process for
approving cyber operations; one that was better aligned to the hyper-dynamic and
time-sensitive nature of the threat. Moving forward, the national-security decision-making apparatus must account for the increasingly compressed decision
space characteristic of emerging technologies.
I.

DECISIONS DELAYED ARE DECISIONS DENIED

The same dynamics that drove replacement of the Obama-era policy with
National Security PresidentialMemorandum (NSPM) 13, United States Cyber

OperationsPolicy, are also implicated by a host of emerging technologies, from
Artificial Intelligence (AI), to drones and drone swarms, to space capabilities,
and more.6 Although each presents different risk considerations, one thread is
common to most emerging-technology threats-decision timelines are growing
increasingly compressed, and a decision delayed is a decision denied. National
security decision-making processes must account for this growing reality.
A. The Promise and Threat of Emerging Technology and the Shrinking

OODA Loop
Emerging technologies "pose[] both peril and promise." 7 Technology is
reshaping the world at an exceptional pace and scale, especially with regard to
how individuals, institutions, and nations all interact. The current and future benefits of technology are substantial and often obvious. Digital interconnection, the
democratization of knowledge, and the record-setting speed of the development

5. Under the Obama administration, it was stated policy "that we shall undertake the least action
necessary to mitigate threats and that we will prioritize network defense and law enforcement as
preferred courses of action." OFF. OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SEC'Y, FACT SHEET ON PRESIDENTIAL
POLICY DIRECTIVE

20 (2013).
-

6. Honorable Paul C. Ney, Jr., Gen. Couns., Dep't of Def., Remarks at U.S. Cyber Command Legal
Conference (Mar. 2, 2020) tt s: erma.cc

7.

WHITE HOUSE, INTERIM NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

7-8 (2021).
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and deployment of COVID-19 vaccines are just a few examples. As long as the
U.S. maintains a competitive advantage on defense and other national security
related technologies, the benefit of those capabilities should be apparent.
At the same time, "the direction and consequences of the technological revolution remain unsettled," as emerging technologies "remain largely ungoverned by
laws or norms designed to center rights and democratic values, foster cooperation, establish guardrails against misuse or malign action, and reduce uncertainty
and manage the risk that competition will lead to conflict." 8 State and non-state
threat actors are leveraging technology at an increasing rate to erode U.S. power,
influence and security. According to the Intelligence Community (IC):
New technologies, rapidly diffusing around the world, put increasingly sophisticated capabilities in the hands of small groups and individuals as well as
enhancing the capabilities of nation states. While democratization of technology can be beneficial, it can also be economically, militarily, and socially
destabilizing. For this reason, advances in technologies such as computing,
biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and manufacturing warrant extra attention to anticipate the trajectories of emerging technologies and understand
their implications for security.'

Technology is rapidly diminishing the security of geography and distance,
affording our adversaries options and advantages that they previously lacked.
The ability to reach across the globe in near-real-time to steal or manipulate critical information, influence populations, interfere in democratic processes and governance, and damage critical infrastructure, are just a few examples. Technology
enables threat actors to challenge U.S. national security in novel ways and with
unprecedented scope, scale, depth, and critically, speed. Although (as of the time
of this writing) attribution of the Colonial Pipeline shutdown remains uncertain,
the reach and speed with which a threat actor was able to disrupt fuel distribution
across the eastern United States has profound national security implications. 10
Clearly, if properly managed, technology can and should be used to enhance
national security decision-making and actions. However, technology can both
stress and compress the decision-making cycle. Consider technology's impact
within the frame of Colonel John Boyd's now famous Observe, Orient, Decide,
Act-or OODA-Loop decision framework, which he developed to outpace his
enemy's decisions in the chaotic and face-paced environment of air-to-air combat." On the one hand, the ability to collect, process, and disseminate data and
information-the key to observing and orienting-is now nearly unbounded and
will only increase with improvements in big-data analytics, Al, and Quantum

8. Id. at 8-9.
9. OFF. DiR. NAT'L INTEL., supra note 4.

-

-

10. David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, Pipeline Attack Yields Urgent Lessons About U.S.
Cybersecurity, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2021), tt s: erma.cc
11. JOHN R. BOYD, A DISCOURSE ON WINNING AND LOSING (2018), tt s:
erma.cc
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computing. At first blush, this should be viewed as a net positive. But like Say's
law of economics, the unending supply of information creates its own demand
which can become insatiable for a decision-maker, and lead quickly to information overload and decision paralysis.12 Decisions made on imperfect or incomplete information carry inherent risk, and the knowledge that there is potentially
more to gather is often the safe space of the risk averse. Also, the real-time command and control reach that technology enables is tempting fare for the risk
averse and those inclined to wield the long screwdriver.
Conversely, as then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph
Dunford noted in 2018, "[a]dvancements in space, information systems, cyberspace, electronic warfare, and missile technology have accelerated the speed and
complexity of war. As a result, decision space has collapsed. ... "13 General
Dunford's observation is not limited to warfare, but extends across the entirety of
the national security landscape. The technology-enabled threats posed to U.S.
national security today-from adversaries, from nonstate threat actors, and even
from the risk that critical technological systems fail-compel a compressed
decision-to-action timeline that can respond to and outpace threats in real-time.
This collapsing decision space naturally involves risk, the tolerance of which
must be balanced against the consequences of delay or inaction. For example,
unmanned combat systems, such as drone swarms and other artificial intelligence-powered weaponry, act rapidly and thus necessitate the use of automated
defensive systems that can respond to and mitigate those threats on a proportionately compressed timeline. This is because the speed of human decision-making,
as Army Futures Command head General John Murray has stated, is likely insufficient for fighting automated kinetic threats like swarms of enemy drones, leaving automated decision-making as a potentially more, and perhaps the only,
viable option.14 Managing each of these engagement decisions out of the White
House is simply infeasible.
Another example of the need for greater speed and agility in national security
decision-making is the specter of autonomous or self-adapting cyber threats. The
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has already demonstrated that self-learning worms that can scan, patch vulnerabilities, and potentially exploit networks and systems on the fly are not theoretical." Such
capabilities could be deployed in the not-too-distant future both against the
United States and as a tool to counter cyber threats. For instance, one DARPA
project is focused on developing autonomous software to "counter malicious

12. Say's law: supply creates its own demand, ECONOMIST (Aug. 12, 2017), 1 s:

erma.cc

Q. 2, 2 (2018),

tt

s:

erma.cc

-

13. General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., The Characterof War and Strategic Landscape Have Changed,

89 JOINT FORCE

-

14. See David Hambling, Drone Swarms Are Getting Too Fastfor Humans to Fight, U.S. General
Warns, FORBES (Jan. 27, 2021, 10:43 AM), tt s: erma.cc
tt s:

erma.cc

-

15. Patrick Tucker, Trump's Pick for NSA/CyberCom Chief Wants to Enlist AI for Cyber Offense,
DEF. ONE (Jan. 9, 2018),
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botnet implants and similar large-scale malware." 16 If cyber threats have accelerated the speed and complexity of conflict, the OODA Loop timelines of these
automated cyber engagements will be measured in nanoseconds, not the months
to years that marked deliberations over cyber operations in the past-at least until
2018.
B. NSPM-13, U.S. Cyber Operations,and the "Speed of Relevance"
The year 2018 saw a sea change in the U.S. government's approach to cyber
threats. Changes in strategy, legislation, and policy all served to reorient the U.S.
from a posture of restraint and relative inaction, to one of proaction and persistent
engagement in cyberspace. This shift was in no small measure driven by the
leadership of then Secretary of Defense James Mattis and General Dunford, who
recognized the changing face of national security threats and the need to fundamentally change the decision-making culture within the Department of Defense
and the broader national security community. 18 They are both credited with coining a phrase that is now de rigueurin DoD lexicon: the speed of relevance-the
notion that decisions and actions must be relevant to and outpace our threats. 19
Leaving aside the obvious question of just how one measures how fast relevance
moves, their insight and objective in using this rhetorical tool deserves praise.
Both recognized that outmoded and overly bureaucratic processes as well as a
culture of risk aversion were maladapted to the current threat environment and
needed to change.
Also issued in 2018, NSPM-13 was aimed precisely at adapting the national security decision-making cycle to the realities of cyberspace. It replaced
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-20, issued under the Obama administration,
which previously established the U.S. government review process for cyber
operations-a process that was notorious for reinforcing indecision. 2 According
to Brigadier General Alexus Grynkewich, then serving as the Deputy Director for
Global Operations on the Joint Staff, PPD-20 required "an interagency process
that went through the National Security Council and all the way up from a policy
coordination committee to a deputies' committee to a principals' committee,"
effectively meaning "anyone could stop the process at any point." 2 1 In contrast,
NSPM-13 provides "for the delegation of well-defined authorities to the
16.

DUSTIN FRAZE, DEF.

ADVANCED

RSCH. PROJECTS

AGENCY,

HARNESSING

AUTONOMY

FOR

.

COUNTERING CYBERADVERSARY SYSTEMS (HACCS), 1 s: _erma.cc
17. See Gary P. Corn & Emily Goldman, Defend Forward and Persistent Engagement, in THE
UNITED STATES' CYBER STRATEGY AND "DEFEND FORWARD": A COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL ASSESSMENT

-

(forthcoming 2022).
18. See Joe Dransfield, How Relevant is the Speed of Relevance?: Unity of Effort Towards Decision
Superiority is Critical to Future U.S. Military Dominance, STRATEGY BRIDGE (Jan. 13, 2020), t s:
_erma.cc -

19. Id.
-

20. See Robert Chesney, CYBERCOM's Out-of-Network Operations: What Has and Has Not
Changed Over the Past Year?, LAWFARE (May 9, 2019, 5:56 PM), tt s: erma.cc
tt s:

erma.cc

-

21. Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., Trump Eases Cyber Ops, But Safeguards Remain: Joint Staff,
BREAKING DEF. (Sept. 17, 2018, 5:30 PM),
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Secretary of Defense to conduct time-sensitive military operations in cyberspace."2 2 In line with the shift to a more proactive cyber strategy noted above,

NSPM-13 enables faster, more agile decision-making better adapted to the strategic threat. It does so not only by allowing delegations of authority, but by reinforcing those delegations with a coordination and approval process run by the
delegee, not the NSC.23
Because NSPM-13 remains classified, it is difficult to fully gauge whether it
strikes the right balance between speed and sufficiently coordinated decisions,
but indications thus far are that it has achieved the objective of enabling more agile responses to cyber threats. Starting with the widely reported and successful
operations in defense of the 2018 mid-term elections, General Nakasone, the
Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, has steadily implemented his approach of
persistent engagement and defend forward operations and activities, acknowledging that the command has conducted dozens of operations to counter foreign
cyber and influence threats. 4 Obviously there is no one-size-fits-all model for
posturing the national security apparatus to manage each distinct threat scenario,
but there are important lessons to be taken from the NSPM-13 effort to adopt "a
more agile, expeditious decision-making structure. "25

II.

PROCESS SHOULD ENABLE OUTCOMES, NOT PROCESS (AKA FIGHT THE THREAT,
NOT EACH OTHER)

Replacing PPD-20 was no small task. For some time, the process was bogged
down by "bureaucratic inertia, turf fights, and some genuine unresolved issues
... ."26 As Brigadier General Grynkewich noted, whether intended or not, PPD20 afforded departments and agencies a means to deadlock the approval process,
and thereby in effect, make decisions through inaction.27 The motives behind any
such instance are knowable only to those involved and could at times have been
based on "genuine unresolved" legal, policy, or risk concerns, but the "turf wars"
that National Security Advisor Bolton alluded to cannot, in all circumstances, be
ruled out. 2 8 Either way, an effective decision-making process should be designed
to aid the designated decision-maker in rendering a decision. A process that
allows participants to effectively usurp decision authority without the attendant
accountability is a design flaw, not a feature.
Imposing process for process' sake is a fool's errand, unless the objective is to
drive interminable debate and bureaucratic inertia. Process is a means to an end,
not an end in itself, and so it should always be designed to fulfill an objective. In

-

22. Ney, supranote 6.
23. See Freedberg, supra note 21.
24. See Press Release, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Cyber Command Expects Lessons from 2018 Midterms
to Apply in 2020, 1s: _erma.cc
-a
25. Shannon Vavra, Here's What John Bolton had to Say About Cybersecurity Policy in his New
Book, CYBERSCOOP (June 22, 2020), tt s: erma.cc

26. Id.
27. Freedburg, supra note 21.
28. See Vavra, supra note 25.
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the case of national security decision-making, the objective is to achieve the most
well-informed decision possible under a given set of circumstances, including
acceptable risk parameters and time available. The increasingly complex, fastmoving, and dynamic nature of modern national security threats requires disciplined decentralization of action consistent with centralized intent. This generally
starts with delegating decision authority to the official best-suited to make-and
who will be held accountable for-the decision. The process should then be
designed to assist that decisionmaker by identifying and presenting the information relevant to making the decision, as well as involving the departments, agencies or other stakeholders who can provide that information or have a key stake in
the decision to be taken.
Unfortunately, the same players who should be facilitating decisions often leverage aspects of existing processes to push parochial, institutional agendas.
Some have described the interagency process generally as a forum for fighting
ourselves far harder than we fight our adversaries. 29 When process is allowed to
disfunction in this way, it fails. This is not to say that there are not legitimate legal
and policy questions that need to be vetted as part of an informed decisionmaking process; the law of unintended consequences among them. But often,
rather than serving as a forcing function to resolve these issues, they are raised as
a proxy for interagency disputes and power struggles.
Consider an issue that plagued the cyber-operations approval process for years
-the applicability of the Covert Action Statute (CAS) to DoD cyber operations. 30 On its face, the CAS is more of a procedural than a substantive statute and
leaves to the President's discretion the decision as to which department or agency
will conduct a particular covert action. 31 However, as a matter of longstanding
policy, the conduct of covert action is the sole province of the Central
Intelligence Agency, 32 and the CAS is often invoked within the interagency as
substantively demarcating the boundaries of institutional roles and authorities. As
a result, unless a proposed activity falls within one of the enumerated and narrowly construed exceptions to the CAS's definition of covert action-such as the
exception for traditional military activities (TMAs) in the case of DoD operationsthe CAS is frequently invoked as a bar to action. Given the inherently clandestine nature of cyber operations, the CAS proved to be a substantial obstacle in the approval
process for DoD operations until Congress stepped in with the passage of Section
1632 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2019, which
defined clandestine military cyber operations as TMAs. 33 In doing so, Congress noted

29. Id.; see also John Hamre, Reflections: Improving the Interagency Process, DEF.360 (Feb. 23,
2016), tt s: erma.cc

30. 50 U.S.C. § 3093.
31. 5 U.S.C. § 3093(a).
32. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981), as amended by Exec. Order No. 13,470 § 1.7
(a), U.S. Intelligence Activities 73 Fed. Reg. 45325 (July 30, 2008); see also 50 U.S.C. § 3093(a)(3).
33. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232

(Aug. 13, 2018)

§ 1632.
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its displeasure that the perceived ambiguity as to whether DoD cyber operations
qualified as TMA had been the cause of "difficulties within the interagency in obtaining mission approval," with the "unfortunate [result] that the executive branch [had]
squandered years in interagency deliberations. ...
The point is not to litigate the merits of the CAS versus TMA debate. It is to
highlight that institutional parochialism and interests are a reality of the interagency structure that have to be guarded against, not incentivized or facilitated.
Legitimate legal and policy issues (and ambiguities) are part of the risk calculus
that must be considered in any decision-making process. They should not be
leveraged as proxies for institutional jockeying, however, as the responsibility for
reaching a decision ultimately lies with one official, and not with the process
itself. Given the increasingly compressed decision-making cycle that new technologies and national-security threats require, we can ill afford processes that
impede, delay, or effectively usurp decision-making authority. This holds true no
matter which department or agency will be delegated decision authority or tasked
to act.35
III. MOVING FORWARD

In the high-stakes arena of national security, decision-making is ultimately
about risk management and the singular focus of any decision-making process
should be to drive sound, risk-informed, but timely decisions. In the face of a
given national security threat, inaction may prove to be the best course to follow.
But like any potential course of action, the decision not to act must be a deliberate
one, taken after comparing the risks and rewards of inaction over action. On the
other hand, inaction born of decision delay or paralysis, or even worse, decision
avoidance, is an unacceptable outcome bordering on dereliction. Unfortunately,
emerging technologies will likely continue to make this calculus harder as decision space and timelines condense and the imminence of threats increases.
National security decision-making processes must account for this factor moving
forward.
The replacement of PPD-20 with NSPM-13 serves as an example of how the
dynamics of national security decision-making are changing, necessitating more
agile and responsive approval processes for confronting emerging threats. PPD20 was apparently designed to provide oversight, coordination, and interagency
review of cyber operations, but it proved too slow and cumbersome, withheld risk
decisions at unrealistic levels, and allowed interagency coordination to stifle decisions. Risk, policy and legal considerations, and interagency equities remain important and should be accounted for in any decision-making process, but not in a

34. H.R. REP. No. 115-874, at 1049 (2018) (Conf. Rep.).
35. See Zach Dorfman, Kim Zetter, Jenna McLaughlin & Sean D. Naylor, Exclusive: Secret Trump
order gives CIA more powers to launch cyberattacks, YAHOO! NEws (July 15, 2020), tt s: erma.cc
Robert Chesney, The CIA, Covert Action and Operations in Cyberspace, LAWEARE BLOG
-;
(July 15, 2020, 3:43 PM), tt s: erma.cc
(noting for example, reports of the President
delegating greater flexibility for cyber covert action to the CIA in 2018).
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way that allows process to usurp decision authority and accountability. As we
face new threats and new areas of technology that we will need to protect against
and employ in our national interest, we should build on the lessons we have
learned in the context of cyber operations and ensure decision-making processes
account for the increasingly compressed decision space and timeliness that leaders will face.

